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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John A. Chernak*

Whether Police Officer is Liable in Tort for missible-The defendant was captured after a
Alleged Wrongful Shooting is a Question for short chase by police officers. Compelled to use
the Jury--Police officers were called by a bar- force in order to effect the arrest, the arresting
tender to stop a fight between two men who officer injured the defendant, causing him to
had been drinking. When the officers arrived bleed. Approximately one hour later the dethe men were seated quietly drinking beer. Ac- fendant confessed to a charge of housebreaking
cording to the plaintiff's witnesses, the officers and larceny. During the course of the trial the
proceeded to the table where the men were defendant repudiated his confession which was
seated and began to pummel one of the men admitted over his objection. Upon appeal to the
with their night sticks. Drawing back from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
victim, one of the officers shot the man to death. it was held, assuming that the arresting officers
Subsequently the plaintiff, as sole survivor of had used no more force than reasonably necesthe intestate, brought an action against the two sary to effect the arrest, that "when a conpolice officers and the City of Yonkers for fession is elicited so soon after the use of
wrongful death of the deceased, alleging in violence upon the prisoner, resulting in bloodseparate counts that the officers were negligent, shed, the compelling inference is that the conthat they had committed an assault and battery fession is not the free act of the prisoner. It is
upon the deceased and that the city was guilty immaterial that other coercion did not occur
of having negligently employed unreliable at the very moments he was questioned and
police officers. At the close of plaintiff's proof signed the statement. Violence at the hands of
the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss the the Police admittedly had occurred within about
action against the city and at the close of all an hour. A confession made in such circumthe evidence dismissed the first cause of action stances, and thereafter repudiated by the
against the police officers for negligence, sub- accused, should not be admitted in a criminal
mitting only the assault count to the jury. The trial in a Federal court." Payton v. United
plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of the States, 222 F.2d 794 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
negligence count against the police officers
after the jury had found for the defendants
Witness Not Entitled to Counsel in Hearing
on the issue of assault. In granting a new trial Before State Fire Marshal-An investigation
to the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of New was commenced by the Ohio Fire Marshal conYork stated that it was a question of fact for cerning a certain fire. During the course of the
the jury as to whether or not the officers were proceedings witnesses called by the Marshal
engaged in making an arrest at the time of the refused to testify on the ground that the
shooting and whether or not the force used in Marshal refused to permit them to be repremaking such an arrest was more than was re- sented by counsel. The Marshal thereupon
quired so as to constitute negligence on the sentenced the witnesses to a term in the county
part of the arresting officers. Flamer v. City of jail. The witnesses then petitioned for a writ of
Yonkers, 127 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1955).
habeas corpus, arguing that the Fire Marshal
is not authorized to exclude counsel, and, in
Force Required. to Arrest Suspect Renders
the alternative, that if the statute does auConfession Obtained Soon Thereafter Inad- thorize exclusion of counsel, it is violative of
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University,
both the 14th Amendment and of Article I,
§10 of the Constitution of Ohio. relating to
School of Law.
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self-incrimination and the right to representation
by counsel.
The statute states, in applicable part: "Investigation by or under the direction of the
fire marshal may be private. The marshal may
exclude from the place where such investigation is held all persons other than those required to be present,..." Omo REv. CODE,
§3737.13 (1954). In affirming a judgment
denying the relief sought, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the statute gives no intimation that counsel for a witness is required to be
present and that the Marshal may properly
exclude counsel. Addressing itself to the
constitutional objections, the court said: "There
is no 'trial' or 'criminal case' pending; there is
no 'actxsed party'; this matter is not pending
in 'any court'; self-incrimination is not involved, inasmuch as the Fire Marshal agrees
that the appellants can not be compelled to
testify against themselves; the privilege is not
personal; and these appellants have not even
been sworn, as this court held necessary in the
case of State v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 N.E.
135 (1915), before the privilege can be asserted." In re Groban, 128 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio
1955).
Examination of Exhibit Slide under Microscope by Trial and Appellate Judges Held
Proper-In State v. Martin, 128 N.E.2d 7
(Ohio 1955) the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter in the second degree by reason of
his reckless operation of a motor vehicle. The
evidence introduced by the state at the trial
without a jury was largely circumstantial, one
portion thereof consisting of an exhibit slide on
which was mounted fibers taken from the defendant's car together with fibers taken from
the jacket of the deceased. After the state's
expert had testified that he could find no difference between the two fibers in composition,
size or color the trial judge examined the
slide under the microscope. On appeal the
judges of the Court of Appeals also examined
the slide, assisted by the expert from the Toledo
crime laboratory. This, the defendant argued,
was error. The Supreme Court of Ohio held
that it was proper for the appellate court to

examine the exhibit and the fact that it was
necessary for an expert to demonstrate the use
of the microscope did "not affect the propriety
of such examination." Although an appellate
court is not required to determine the weight
of the evidence it may examine the record to
ascertain whether or not the proper rules as to
the weight of the evidence and the degree of
proof have been applied.
Radar Evidence Held to be Admissible Without Expert Testimony as to its General Nature
or Trustworthiness-A radar team working the
New Jersey Turnpike issued a summons and
complaint to the defendant charging him with
traveling 66 miles per hour in a 60-mile speed
zone. At the time of the trial the evidence
showed that the troopers had been operating
the radar equipment--consisting of transmitting
and receiving devices, a calibrated speedmeter
needle and a permanent graph indicating the
speed of cars passing within its range-for approximately a year; and that on the day in
question they had set up their equipment, allowed it to warm-up, tested it by driving their
car within its range and comparing its reading
with that of the speedometer on the car and
had otherwise properly and carefully insured
that it would give accurate readings. The state
also produced an expert witness who testified
as to the general nature and trustworthiness of
radar devices in general and of the one used in
this case in particular. The trial court found the
defendant guilty of exceeding the speed limit,
expressly finding that the radar equipment "was
properly set up and tested for accuracy and was
functioning properly and was a correct recorder
of speed."
On appeal from his conviction the defendant
attacked the radar evidence primarily on the
ground that the testimony indicated that there
was possible tolerance of error, thereby rendering the radar evidence inaccurate and unreliable. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the testimony showed that any inaccuracies resulting from the placing of the equipment or other factors would produce lower
rather than higher readings. The Court then
proceeded -to examine prior decisions and nu-
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merous articles dealing with the use of evidence
from radar speedmeters. Analogizing the development of radar to other scientific discoveries, such as fingerprinting, X-ray machines,
blood grouping tests and the like, the Court
said: "The writings on the subject assert that
when properly operated they accurately record
speed (within reasonable tolerances of perhaps
two to three miles per hour) and nothing to the
contrary has been brought to our attention;
under. the circumstances it would seem that
.evidence of radar speedmeter readings should
be received in evidence upon a showing that
the speedmeter was properly set up and tested
by the police officers without any need for independent expert testimony by electrical engineers as to its general nature and trustworthiness." Thus, the Court, in effect, indicated
that the accuracy of a radar speedmeter device
is a proper subject for judicial notice. Once the
state has shown that device was properly tested
and operated, its readings will constitute admissible evidence to be weighed with other
evidence introduced into the record. State v.
Dantonio, 115 A.2d 35 (N.J. 1955). For an
examination of the impact of this decision,
See, 3 TRAFFIc DIGEST & REV. 10 (No. 9,
Sept. 1955).
Polygraph "Lie-Detector" Held to be Insufficiently Reliable to Permit Acceptance of
Test Results in Judicial Proceedings-Appellant, who had been previously convicted of
robbery, petitioned for special relief in the form
of a habeas corpus proceeding. One of the
points upon which the appellant relied was
that he had repeatedly requested a lie-detector
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test to prove his innocence. In the process of
denying the writ, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania wade the following observations concerning lie-detector tests: "The request for a
lie-detector is quite unusual. Appellant urges us
to hold that the polygraph test has now reached
the stage of scientific reliability that it should
be so recognized in our law of evidence ....
Appellant does not suggest to what use the
results of the test would be put in this ptoceeding in the event they were favorable to him.
He says merely that it would be some more
evidence of his innocence. How much more
evidence of his innocence it would be is highly
questionable. We know of no recognized authority which has ventured to state that the
polygraph test is judicially acceptable. The
basic case of Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C.
46, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145, in 1923 held
that such tests were not yet developed to the
point of reliability, and thus an offer to introduce the results of such test were properly
refused. Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions
have similarly so held. Our Supreme Court has
on two occasions recognized the use of the liedetector as an inducement by interrogators to
procure a statement or confession. Comn. r.
Hippie,333 Pa. 33, 2 A.2d 353 ;Com. v. Jones,341
Pa.541, 19 A.2d 389. That does not mean, however, that the test results themselves will be
recognized and admitted into evidence. The
reliability and scientific infallibility of the
polygraph, lie-detector, or other psychological
deception test must be more definitely established before our courts will accept their
results as credible." Commmtwealth -,. Dilwarlh,
115 A.2d 865 (Pa.Super. 1955).

